33. The Chinese Defeat Marshall

The June, 1946, cease-fire was a misnomer. Although there was no major offensive by either side, it opened with Communist movements in Shandong province along the Qingdao-Jinan railway and Nationalist and Red claims each was attacked by the other in Manchuria.1

Chen Lifu of the CC clique told John F. Melby, second secretary of the U.S. embassy, that there was no hope of an agreement but believed the Reds could be destroyed with little difficulty.2 This easy confidence seized Chiang Kai-shek as well and he demanded that the Reds evacuate Jehol and Chahar provinces (north and west of Beiping) and Yantei (Chefoo) and Weihaiwei on the north coast of Shandong and permit KMT reinforcement of Qingdao so U.S. marines there could withdraw. In Manchuria, Chiang ordered government troops to occupy Harbin and a number of other cities.3

Zhou Enlai refused to agree to anything but to restore the previous status quo in Shandong and especially recoiled at withdrawing from Jehol and Chahar because this would close off the Communists' land communications with Manchuria.4

In the midst of this, the United States extended the Nationalists credit for 51 million dollars worth of civilian-type equipment and supplies and drafted a bill to provide military assistance, including training KMT air force and army officers in the U.S.5 These were powerful gestures of support and had a predictable effect: Nationalist leaders began to speak even more freely that only force would solve the conflict.6

Fearing civil war was about to erupt, Marshall pressured Chiang into extending the truce to June 30. But the Generalissimo demanded that the Communists accept an American vote as decisive in all disputes on the "committee of three"7 or the executive headquarters. Zhou agreed but Marshall rejected the idea because he felt the U.S. could not bear this heavy responsibility.8

Although the People's Consultation Council (PCC) and Chiang himself had agreed on April 27 to postpone a meeting of the National Assembly indefinitely, Chiang on July 5 announced he was convening the National Assembly on November 12, 1946. The great bulk of delegates were KMT members elected nine years previously and Zhou Enlai told Marshall that Chiang's action was designed "to effect a national split."9

Indeed, as Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists became increasingly unwilling to make any concessions, China polarized at the two political extremes. On June 23, 1946, KMT secret police in Nanjing brutally beat up thirteen persons, none Communist, who wanted to petition Chiang Kai-shek for peace.10 In Kunming secret police assassinated two well-known members of the Democratic League and intimidated leading league members and liberals elsewhere. The government suppressed six liberal newspapers and magazines.11 Critics of the regime now feared to speak out. Nationalist forces harassed a Red army north of Wuhan that they had surrounded in May and tried to prevent its retreat beyond the Yellow river.12 On June 25 Chiang told the Communists to evacuate all of north Jiangsu province, the Qingdao-Jinan railway, two key towns northeast of Beiping threatening KMT rail communications with Manchuria, Harbin and the entire region around Dandong on the Yalu.13

The greatest demand involved northern Jiangsu, where twenty-million people lived under Communist rule. Much of the land had been redistributed to the peasants and the landlords ousted. If the KMT returned, so would the landlords and they would settle their grudges by force.14 Zhou Enlai tried to negotiate but Chiang was unyielding.15

In July the Communist party renamed its forces the People's Liberation Army (PLA), thus symbolizing that the Reds had put aside compromise and viewed the contest as a ideological battle for the allegiance of the Chinese people.16

The situation now deteriorated rapidly. Fighting between Reds and Nationalists broke out in a number of locations while Marshall vainly tried to hunt for a compromise.17

Marshall had been convinced for some time that he needed a full-time ambassador at Nanjing to help him. President Truman nominated and on July 11, 1946, the Senate confirmed the man he selected. He was Dr. J. Leighton Stuart, a 70-year-old China-born American missionary and president of Yenching university, Beiping, who had spent most of his life in China. In making this decision, Marshall reversed his earlier plan to bring back as ambassador Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, the former China theater commander. Marshall felt Wedemeyer's close ties to Chiang Kai-shek would make the Reds suspicious and he felt he needed an ambassador "who would immediately create on both sides" a feeling confidence in the negotiations.18 Stuart's knowledge of China impressed Marshall and he hoped together they could convince the two sides to come to a settlement.19 This possibility had long since passed, however.

Meanwhile, Communists began to concentrate on the U.S. marines in China, symbols of American intervention. In mid-July Red troops kidnapped seven marines in east Hebei and held them for several days. And on July 29 a force of about three-hundred Reds stopped a forty-three-man marine convoy between Tianjin to Beiping. In the fire fight that ensued the Reds killed three marines and wounded eleven. The attack and Communist resistance to an investigation soured American-Communist relations and caused Marshall to order the marines to begin withdrawing from Qingdao, where Nationalist troops had arrived to garrison, but not from Tianjin, Beiping, Tanggu and Quinhuangdao, where KMT forces were in less strength. It was September before the U.S. withdrew most of the remaining marines.20

Meantime severe fighting erupted. Despite Chiang's promise not to attack, the Nationalists began a general offensive immediately after expiration of the June truces. The Americans strangely were not aware of the significance of the attacks at first and Marshall and Ambassador Stuart tried one last time to salvage negotiations, again without success.21

In north Jiangsu Nationalist troops occupied five cities and pushed the ill-equipped Communist troops aside.22 In Shandong fighting was severe along the Qingdao-Jinan railway. In Jehol northeast of Beiping Nationalist troops massed for an attack and in Manchuria they prepared to move against Dandong and Harbin. On August 5, Nationalist warplanes bombed the Red capital at Yan'an.23

President Truman sent the Generalissimo a message bemoaning "the spreading strife and especially the increased tendency to suppress freedom of the press as well as the expression of liberal views among intellectuals." Truman, however, refused to threaten sanctions.24 Chiang Kai-shek ignored the tongue-lashing.25

Part of the reason why Chiang Kai-shek and the most ultraconservative members of the KMT were not worried was that the United States government was concluding (August 30) a lavish agreement with Nanjing authorizing the sale on credit of 900 million dollars worth of war surplus property for 175 million dollars, a colossal bargain. This was theoretically "civilian-type" material but included small ships, air force supplies, motor vehicles and much other material that had definite military application. Besides, the Nationalists planned to sell much of the property to purchase arms and ammunition. The surplus-property sale and continuing strategic economic support severely compromised the United States' claim to impartiality.26

Nevertheless, the United States did not want to present a flagrant case of favoritism while Marshall was continuing negotiations and on August 30 slapped the Kuomintang's wrist, disapproving sale of a quantity of small-arms ammunition. However, the U.S. partially lifted the embargo in October and rescinded it entirely in May, 1947. Besides, the ban came much too late to restrain the Nationalist war plans.27

The Nationalists pursued their offensive in north Jiangsu, cleared the Communists from the Qingdao-Jinan railway and captured Chengde in Jehol. The lightly armed Communist troops largely reverted to their traditional semiguerrilla tactics, concentrating upon hit-and-run attacks and blocking Nationalist communications and supply lines.28

It had become clear by autumn, 1946, that Chiang Kai-shek was intent on driving the Communists out of their key areas of occupation, either by agreement or military force. The Communists knew their only hope for survival rested on their possession of safe military positions where they could strike at critical strategic targets like the railways. From this stage on, all talk was merely cover for the political goal each side now clearly sought: complete control of China and the eradication of the other party.29

The attempt of the United States to be an honest broker had been sullied by its partisanship for the KMT. Zhou Enlai departed Nanjing on September 16, 1946, for Shanghai, telling Marshall he would remain until Marshall decided to convene the committee of three to issue a cease-fire order.30

On October 1, Marshall wrote the Generalissimo he opposed the KMT policy of settling differences by force and threatened: "Unless a basis for agreement is found to terminate the fighting without further delays of proposals and counterproposals, I will recommend to the president that I be recalled and that the United States government terminate its efforts at mediation."31

Marshall's ultimatum had no effect upon Chiang. He responded the next day by requiring the Red army to relocate and begin demobilization but made no mention of a similar action by the Nationalists, thus reneging on his February 25 agreement for mutual Red and KMT demobilization. Marshall radioed Dean Acheson he thought the U.S. could not be a party "to a course of questionable integrity."32

At a meeting on October 4 Chiang told Marshall it was unthinkable that he end his mission. Marshall responded that he was convinced the Nationalists were carrying on a campaign of force and disguising it with insincere negotiations. He said he must ask the president for his recall.33 He did so the next day. But angry as he was with Chiang Kai-shek, Marshall still sided with the Nationalists, urging the president to permit no word of the action to leak into the press, "where it would do irreparable injury to the Chinese government in favor of the Communists."34 Chiang got word through Stuart of Marshall's request for recall. He recognized the public-relations disaster this would bring and offered to halt operations for five days against Kalgan (Zhangjiakou) which he was besieging. Nevertheless, he remained unwilling to make any real concessions. However, Marshall asked Washington to hold up the announcement of his recall and, once again hopeful, asked Chiang for an extended cease-fire and an attack on substantive issues dividing the two sides. But Chiang made no concessions and Zhou Enlai spurned any further useless talks.35 Marshall went to Shanghai, where Zhou told him the only solution was a lasting cease-fire.36 Marshall saw that his efforts now appeared to be futile.37

Nationalist troops continued to attack, capturing Kalgan and Chifeng, northeast of Beiping, and moving strongly in northern Jiangsu. The government reintroduced nationwide military conscription, suspended at the end of the war with Japan.38

Despite deep suspicion of Chiang, Zhou Enlai returned to Nanjing on October 20 under pressure of the minor parties and conferred with Chiang. But nothing came of the meeting and Nationalist forces continued their attacks in a number of locations.39 Fearing the worst, the Communists began evacuating personnel from Nanjing, Shanghai and Chongqing in U.S. aircraft provided by General Marshall.40

Chiang Kai-shek now produced an extremely provocative and unforgiving cease-fire statement. When Stuart and Marshall attempted to talk him into moderating it, the Generalissimo insisted the KMT government was now unanimous that force was the only course to follow against the Communists.41

Despite their disapproval of its content, Marshall and Stuart assisted Chiang in producing a formal statement on November 8. It was a self-serving fabrication attempting to show Chiang's sincere interest in constitutional democracy and peace. His one partial concession to the Reds and minor parties was to submit to the National Assembly the uncompleted revised constitution of the PCC constitutional drafting committee.42

When the National Assembly met on November 12, the Youth party and some non-party delegates attended in addition to KMT members but the Communist party and Democratic League, though offered token seats, boycotted it.43

Zhou Enlai informed Marshall that meeting of the National Assembly sealed the door on further negotiations. He told Marshall he feared the Nationalists would launch an offensive against Yan'an and this would end any hope for a negotiated peace. Zhou asked Marshall for an American airplane to carry him and nine other Red officials back to Yan'an. He also asked whether American aircraft would fly out to Red-held places the remaining Communist officials in Nationalist-held cities. Marshall agreed and asked Zhou to find out in Yan'an whether the Communists considered him impartial and wanted him to mediate any longer. Without such endorsement it was useless for him to remain any longer in China, he said. Zhou promised to put the question to the Communist leadership.44

Zhou Enlai flew out of Nanjing on November 19. His departure marked the end of the long period of Red-KMT negotiations that began in January. It also to all intents and purposes ended General Marshall's role in China. However, Marshall continued doggedly to remain. He hoped the Communists would send back a ringing endorsement and ask him to stay on.45

On December 1 Marshall and Chiang demonstrated they were at opposite poles in their approach to ending China's disunity. The Communists probably couldn't be eliminated by military campaigning, Marshall told Chiang, and it was imperative to bring them into the government. Chiang responded with a vow to destroy the Communist military strength and thought he could do it in eight or ten months.46

The virtual final split between Communists and Nationalists came on December 4 when Zhou Enlai sent to Marshall the Red terms for reopening negotiations. They called for dissolving the National Assembly and restoring troop positions of both sides as of January 13. The Reds knew the KMT would never agree to such terms and they served essentially to demonstrate the hopelessness of further negotiations. Zhou pointedly did not answer Marshall's question as to whether the Communists wanted his mediation efforts to continue and his silence was evidence of rejection.47

It was not apparent at the time but the Communists were now preparing not only for civil war but for revolution. On May 4, 1946, the Communist party had secretly issued a directive shifting its policy from reduction of peasant rents, which had ruled during the popular front with the Nationalists during the war with Japan, back to its fundamental policy of land reform. As the hopes for a negotiated settlement with the KMT faded, Mao Zedong settled on the May 4 directive as a way to galvanize peasant support and bring in mass response to army recruiting drives. The peasants only stood firmly with the Communist party, he said, when the land problem had been solved "radically and thoroughly."48

In early December Chiang Kai-shek attempted to get General Marshall to become an advisor to the Nationalist government. Marshall declined. He knew the only reason for asking him was to indicate heavy U.S. backing.

Also early in December Marshall's wife, Katherine, suffering from an aggravating sinus problem, accepted Chiang Kai-shek's offer to fly her to Guam in a new C-54 transport plane he'd bought in the U.S. From there she could catch a navy transport back to Hawaii. Her departure started rumor mills rolling that Marshall himself was planning to return home.49

Marshall, having failed to bring the Communists and Nationalists together, now focused on his new goal: the creation of a new democratic constitution and the development of a genuine liberal center party by coalescing minority groups. He saw such a progressive, nonrevolutionary party as standing between the radical Reds and ultraconservatives on both ends of the spectrum. It was a vision even more unrealistic than Marshall's dream of uniting two opposite political movements, each bent on the other's destruction. In a society divided for two decades between two powerful and antagonistic extremes, the chances for the development and flowering of a powerful middle-of-the-road, reasonable and moderate new party were nil. Marshall saw this in principle but thought Chiang Kai-shek himself could (and might) bring about such a middle force by his leadership.

To Marshall, reared in reverence for the U.S. constitution which protected representative government and individual civil rights, the key was for the Chinese likewise to create a basic liberal political document by which to live and govern themselves. It was a beautiful thought but a constitution was no solution in itself. Its implementation had to grow out of a broad consensus that the constitution's principles must rule in all cases of conflict, not the desires of power-hungry men. At no time since the establishment of the Chinese republic in 1912 had democratic ideals been translated into reality. Instead, the old imperial authoritarianism had merely been transformed into a new republican authoritarianism.

Marshall pushed hard for the National Assembly to adopt a liberal constitution and hoped Communists and Democratic League members might join a new government. He urged leaders of the minority parties to consolidate into a single middle-of-the-road organization. Oddly enough, Chiang Kai-shek actually did override efforts of the CC clique to pass a reactionary constitution and got a reasonably liberal document. The question, however, was whether Chiang would permit this constitution to be implemented or whether he would allow it to be ignored, like Chinese constitutions of the past.50

Marshall pursued his dream of a great centrist party throughout his last weeks in China even in the face of evidence it was hopeless. General Li Weiguo, vice information minister, told Marshall that Chiang Kai-shek would hold members in the KMT against their will, if necessary, and would never permit free expression within the Kuomintang. By implication Chiang would be even less willing to permit formation of an independent liberal party outside the party.51

But Marshall persisted in his efforts to make Chiang Kai-shek realize reform was in his own best interests. He reached the peak of his missionary effort on December 28 when, after congratulating Chiang on his achieving adoption of "a reasonably sound constitution," he urged Chiang to demonstrate "that the constitution was not merely a collection of words and that he was determined to institute a democratic form of government." Marshall admonished Chiang to proceed at once with reorganization of the State Council, appointing a number of liberals from the KMT and leaving vacancies for the Communists and Democratic League.

But, in Marshall's eyes, the most important advice he gave the Generalissimo "was that he must by his own indirect leadership father a coalition of the minority groups into a liberal party." Marshall told Chiang that, "unless there was a sizeable minority group, his efforts in the National Assembly to secure the adoption of a sound constitution would be regarded as mere camouflage of the intention to go ahead with the one-party government." Without assisting in the formation of a liberal party, Marshall said there could be no genuine two-party government. Chiang expressed complete agreement with Marshall. But agreeing was one thing. Giving some of his power away to a liberal party not under his thumb was another. Chiang had become expert in mouthing democratic ideas to visiting Americans and doing nothing to implement them. Marshall was only the latest American envoy to receive the treatment.52

On December 28, Marshall recommended to President Truman that American mediation efforts should be ended, American members on the truce teams eliminated, the remaining U.S. marines withdrawn from Beiping and Tianjin and he himself recalled. Despite the collapse of all of his efforts, Marshall still held on to the illusion that he could influence events in China. "I am of the opinion that I can do much to destroy the power of the reactionaries and bring a liberal element into control of the government by a frank statement" on his departure. He said also he could "paint the Communist picture of misrepresentation and vicious propaganda efforts against the United States" so as to weaken the Red position and guide "misinformed people at home."53

Truman accepted Marshall's recommendations and arranged that Marshall be recalled "for consultation on China and other matters," the "other matters" including his replacement of James Byrnes. Marshall left China on January 8, 1947, and, while he was flying over the Pacific, the White House released Marshall's statement and also announced his appointment as secretary of state.54

In his statement, Marshall blamed both sides for his failure to get an agreement. He noted that a dominant reactionary group in the KMT thwarted his efforts to form a genuine coalition government. In the Communist party zealots employed drastic measures to gain their ends, such as destroying rail lines to wreck the economy. KMT-inspired mob actions in February and March, 1946, gave Red extremists good excuses to conclude that every government proposal was designed to crush the Chinese Communist party. Red propaganda deliberately misrepresented American motives in China.

Marshall execrated "irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China" and charged they had no real intention of implementing the People's Consultation Council agreements. The Communists, on the other hand, were unwilling to "make a fair compromise."

Marshall continued to pursue the chimera of a middle-of-the road party. Action of centrists, "under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek," would "lead to unity through good government." Marshall saw great possibilities in the new democratic constitution which was to come into force in about a year, after elections to be completed on December 25, 1947.

In the end, Marshall pinned his hopes on the willingness of Chiang Kai-shek to relinquish absolute power in elections one year in the future. This hope was unreasonable. A great civil war was raging in large part because this autocrat and his party for twenty years had refused to make any meaningful reforms to alleviate the oppression and exploitation of the Chinese people. To believe that a year hence Chiang and his party would see the light and give democracy to China was a delusion.55

Chapter 34: The U.S. Cuts Its Losses >>

1. FRUS, White Paper, p. 159; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1006, 1019, 1101.

2. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1045-6.

3. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1075-81; FRUS, White Paper, p. 160.

4. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1082-3, 1083-90, 1091-9; FRUS, White Paper, pp. 160-1.

5. Cambridge, vol. 13, pp. 735-6; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 724-51; FRUS, White Paper, p. 227.

6. FRUS, China, 1946, vol ix, pp. 1201-3; FRUS, White Paper, p. 161; Acheson, pp. 204-05.

7. Consisting at this time of Marshall, Zhou Enlai and KMT General Yu Dawei.

8. FRUS, White Paper, pp. 161, 163; FRUS, China, 1946, pp. 1123-5.

9. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1299-1305.

10.. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1191-3; FRUS, White Paper, pp. 170-1.

11. FRUS, White Paper, p. 172; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1468-71; Pogue, p. 122.

12. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1339-41.

13. Ibid., pp. 1193-4; FRUS, White Paper, p. 165; Chassin, Communist Conquest, p. 83.

14. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1222-6.

15. FRUS, White Paper, pp. 167-9; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1263-5.

16. Cambridge, vol. 13, p. 759; Lionel Max Chassin, The Communist Conquest of China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 49-50.

17. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1228-30, 1310-6, 1326-7, 1346-7; FRUS, White Paper, p. 171. Mao Zedong dated the actual beginning of the Chinese civil war from this period. See Cambridge, vol. 13, p. 770.

18. Ibid., pp. 833, 927, 1059-60, 1277, 1297-9, 1307-08, 1316-7; FRUS, White Paper, p. 173; Wedemeyer, pp. 366-7, 369-70; Pogue, pp. 118-9; Acheson, pp. 205-06.

19. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1023, 1106-10; Pogue, pp. 119-21; Acheson, p. 206. Stuart was born at Hangzhou in 1876, the son of a Kentucky missionary father and an Alabama mother. He graduated from Hampden-Sydney College and Union Theological Seminary in Virginia and became a minister in the Southern Presbyterian church before returning to China to teach at Nanjing Theological Seminary and, in 1919, to become president of newly formed Yenching University, formed by the merger of two small colleges, one Methodist and one Presbyterian. Vice president of Yenching was Harry Luce, father of Henry Luce, who founded Time and Life magazines. The Japanese kept Stuart under house arrest from shortly after Pearl Harbor to the end of the war.

20. FRUS, White Paper, p. 172; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1418, 1421, 1424, 1431-7, 1446-7, 1436, 1448-9, 1452-4, 1472, 1474-8, 1479-83, 1496-7, 1507; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 320-30 (marine report of incident), 868-9, 869-71, 880-1.

21. Cambridge, vol. 13, p. 733.

22. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, p. 662.

23. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1427-31, 1450-1.

24. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 1-3; FRUS, White Paper, pp. 175-6, 179, 652.

25. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 51-54, 56-57, 91-92; FRUS, White Paper, pp. 176-9, 649-51, 654.

26. Cambridge, vol. 13, p. 736; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 1033-68 give the complete record of the surplus-property transactions; FRUS, White Paper, pp. 227-8. See also FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 160-1.

27. The State Department White Paper on China in 1949, which generally was apologetic of American actions, in this case acknowledged American inconsistency (FRUS, White Paper, p. 181): "General Marshall was being placed in the untenable position of mediating on the one hand between the two Chinese groups while on the other the United States government was continuing to supply arms and ammunition to one of the two groups, namely, the National government." See also Cambridge, vol. 13, p. 736; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, 108-09, 753-7, 761; Pogue, pp. 123-4, footnote 17, p. 124.

28. FRUS, White Paper, p. 178; Cambridge, vol. 13, pp. 759, 762-3.

29. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 117-46, 152-62; FRUS, White Paper, pp. 182-3.

30. FRUS, White Paper, pp. 184, 186, 654-9; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 189-96, 208-09, 212-4.

31. FRUS, White Paper, pp. 189-90, 662-3; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 267-8.

32. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 268-74, 303-05; FRUS, White Paper, pp. 190-1.

33. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 287-8; FRUS, White Paper, pp. 191-2.

34. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 289-92; FRUS, White Paper, p. 290.

35. FRUS, White Paper, pp. 193-4, 663-5; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 300-01, 310-1.

36. FRUS, White Paper, pp. 194-5, 667-9; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 332-41, 345-8.

37. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, p. 340-1; FRUS, White Paper, pp. 194-6.

38. FRUS, White Paper, pp. 196-7; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 360-2. On October 11, 1946, Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr. replaced Walter S. Robertson as commissioner of the cease-fire executive headquarters in Beiping and Robertson returned to the U.S. See FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, p. 332 note.

39. FRUS, White Paper, pp. 197-9, 673-5; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. ix, pp. 1187-9, 1244-6; vol x, pp. 363-5, 366-9, 373-5, 377-8, 380.

40. FRUS, White Paper, p. 200, 202-03; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 412, 417-8, 425-37, 449, 453.

41. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 473-5, 476-81 (Chiang's draft statement), 481-9, 490-2, 493-4 (Chiang's public statement); FRUS, White Paper, pp. 204-06, 676-8.

42. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 502-11.

43. FRUS, White Paper, pp. 208, 679-85; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 534-5, 543-4, 547-9.

44. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 544-9, 551; FRUS, White Paper, pp. 208-09.

45. FRUS, White Paper, p. 209.

46. FRUS, White Paper, pp. 211-2; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 575-8.

47. FRUS, White Paper, p. 212; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 590-4.

48. Cambridge, vol. 13, pp. 753-4. Suzanne Pepper points out that the May 4, 1946, directive was not published until the early 1980s. For a full analysis of the land-reform program of the Communists, see Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China, The Political Struggle, 1945-1949, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, pp. 229-330.

49. Pogue, p. 136; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, p. 602. Chiang also flew the Marshalls' daughter and her children to China from where they could take a commercial flight to join her husband in India.

50. FRUS, White Paper, p. 213; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 602-05, 618-20, 630-1, 632-6, 640-1, 643-4, 647-50, 653-5, 659-61, 665-6.

51. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 654-5.

52. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 661-5, 689-90; FRUS, White Paper, p. 216.

53. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 664-5, 691, 705-23; FRUS, White Paper, pp. 219, 695. The U.S. formally terminated Marshall's mission on January 11, 1947, and soon thereafter withdrew Americans from executive headquarters in Beiping and the field teams and withdrew all marines from north China except for a guard contingent at Qingdao, where the U.S. Naval Training Group was training Nationalist naval personnel.

54. FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 680-3, 687, 691. Marshall's statement is printed in FRUS, White Paper, pp. 686-9. The U.S. Senate confirmed Marshall's nomination as secretary of state on January 8, 1947, and he took the oath of office on January 21.

55. See an interview on January 13, 1947, by Tillman Durdin in the New York Times with Chen Lifu; FRUS, China, 1946, vol. x, pp. 701-03; Truman, Trial, p. 91.