28. Hurley Sees a Conspiracy

In late November, 1944, General Wedemeyer learned that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) chief, Major General William J. Donovan, was going to visit China. He told his new chief of staff, Major General Robert B. McClure, to come up with some plans for guerrilla warfare, one of the OSS specialties, to present to Donovan, provided Generalissimo Chiang approved.1

Chiang had already angrily turned down a Wedemeyer proposal to supply munitions to the Reds,2 plus an idea of Colonel Barrett to equip three Chinese Communist regiments with American arms, place them under command of an American officer and send them to fight the Japanese.3

General McClure produced a plan he figured was down the OSS alley: send five-thousand American paratroops into Communist areas to organize and lead Red guerrillas in sabotaging Japanese communication lines. Wedemeyer and Donovan approved, whereupon Wedemeyer left for an inspection trip for several weeks. McClure seized on the visit of Colonel Barrett to Yan'an on December 15 and asked Barrett to present the guerrilla plan to the Red leaders. He also showed it to Hurley and told the ambassador he was going to explain it to General Chen Cheng, new Nationalist minister of war. Hurley told him to let T.V. Soong see it as well. Since the plan was still tentative, McClure urged Chen and Soong not to tell Chiang Kai-shek but assured them nothing would be done without the Generalissimo's and Hurley's approval.4

When Colonel Barrett left for Yan'an, his companions included John Paton Davies, Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel Willis H. Bird of the OSS. Barrett was going to Yan'an to deliver a Hurley message demanding that the Reds not publish the five-point agreement of settlement Chiang had rejected and asking the Reds to renew negotiations.5

The Red leaders saw possibilities in the McClure guerrilla proposal but they were excited by a separate plan Colonel Bird presented that was completely unknown to Hurley, Barrett or Wedemeyer's headquarters.6 Bird's offer was a wholly OSS proposal to form a far-reaching unofficial alliance with the Chinese Reds that would completely bypass Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists. It called for placing OSS commandos within the Red army and arming up to 25,000 Communist guerrillas "for purposes of destroying Jap communications, airfields and blockhouses and to generally raise hell and run." The only OSS obeisance to Nationalist or American authority would be that Wedemeyer would select points of attack "in general." To the Communist leaders, here was a different faction offering precisely what they wanted: arms and a direct American connection with their movement. In their ignorance of U.S. power sources, they thought Colonel Bird represented the highest American authorities and this meant that Hurley, with his insistence upon working with Chiang, might safely be ignored. The Red leaders reached agreement with Bird in a single afternoon, a remarkably fast decision which indicates that perhaps OSS operatives had been talking with the Communist leaders for some time about the plan.7

When the Americans flew back to Chongqing on December 17, Barrett carried Zhou Enlai's reply to Hurley's message. It amounted to a flat rejection of further negotiations. Ominously, Zhou said that, while agreeing to postpone publishing the five-point agreement, "when the appropriate time comes" the Reds would announce it.8

Hurley, ignorant of the OSS proposal which had brought on the change, blamed Zhou's intransigence on the supposed machinations of Davies and Barrett. Hurley already was evidencing paranoia that enemies were undermining his efforts and the arrival of Zhou's letter along with Barrett and Davies seemed to confirm his suspicions. Hurley informed Davies that it would be best for him to proceed to Moscow and a few days later accused Davies of "sneaking off" to Yan'an to wreck his negotiations.9

With Zhou's letter confirming his worst fears about prospects of an agreement, Hurley hardened against the Communists and began to look at China in a way that soon became American policy. In the event-ridden first eight months of 1945, there was no one in high office in Washington concerned enough with the comparatively noncritical problems of China to produce a better approach. Also, Hurley reflected thinking that was to become the dominant American belief: the Soviet Union was involved in a worldwide conspiracy to spread Communism and the U.S. had to fight it at every point.

The emerging American position appeared in an appraisal Hurley produced on December 24, 1944, for the new secretary of state, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who, on November 27, had replaced Cordell Hull, 73 years old, in poor health and no longer able to carry on the burdens of office.10

Hurley said American policy (not contradicted by Washington) was to prevent the collapse of the Nationalist government, sustain Chiang, harmonize relations between Chiang and General Wedemeyer, prevent economic collapse and unify all Chinese military forces.11 Hurley, despite the complete breakdown of talks, soon asserted that "we are having some success" with Red-Nationalist negotiations although he admitted "the Kuomintang still hopes to keep China under one-party rule."12

Chinese Communist confidence in help from the OSS rose so high that on January 9, 1945, Mao and Zhou handed Major Roy Cromley of the OSS a message they asked to be sent directly to Washington through military channels. It announced the Communists wished to send an "unofficial group to interpret and explain to American civilians and officials" the problems of China. If Roosevelt would receive them "as leaders of a primary Chinese party," Mao and Zhou themselves would travel to Washington. They asked that Hurley be kept in the dark.13

Mao was proposing that FDR negotiate behind the back of the government he had been supporting throughout the war and the man he had placed in China to represent him.14 This foolish move was an irretrievable error which had disastrous consequences for the Communists.15

Hurley learned of the Red effort on January 13, 1945, when members of the U.S. Navy Group, China, told him something of what had transpired. The news confirmed Hurley's fears of a conspiracy. He radioed President Roosevelt about the attempt to bypass him and said Red hopes for independent military aid from the United States had led to their refusal to negotiate with Chiang.16

Hurley's message drew a strong response in Washington. The government ignored the OSS message. Joseph C. Grew, director of Far Eastern affairs in the State Department and soon to emerge as a spokesman for a hard line against the Communists, complimented Hurley on "the constructive work that you are doing."17 To prevent something like this occurring again, General Marshall ordered Wedemeyer to investigate. On January 24 Wedemeyer had Colonel Willis Bird's report on the OSS proposal he'd made to the Communists and this showed Wedemeyer where the Reds got their unreasonable ideas.18 He sent Bird's report to Marshall and informed the chief of staff he'd told all officers of his command that "we must support the Chinese national government" and that no negotiations were to be carried out with Chinese not approved by Chiang Kai-shek.19 Wedemeyer reassigned McClure and Barrett, both of whom were innocent.20

The effect of the flap was to turn Hurley into an enemy of the Reds and to tie him to Chiang Kai-shek's coattails. The functioning American policy came to be to support the KMT at all costs. Hurley lost all credibility except in the clique around Chiang. Solomon Adler, the U.S. Treasury Department's representative in Chongqing, called Hurley a "stuffed shirt" and was sickened by what he saw as Hurley's pandering to Chiang's reactionary, no-compromise position. His continued blunders, Adler said, might lead to civil war and Communist alienation from the United States.21

Mao and Zhou, seeing that their effort to reach FDR had failed, acquiesced to renewed talks with the Nationalists. Hurley informed Zhou Enlai the Reds would get no U.S. aid or support until after they reached a political compromise acceptable to Chiang. Zhou returned to Chongqing.22 The talks, however, hung up on the rocks that had shattered the previous discussions: the KMT demand that the Reds turn their troops and base over to Nationalist control and Chiang's refusal to end his one-party dictatorship.23

* * * * * * * * * *

The selection of Yalta in the Soviet Crimea as site of the Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin summit conference showed how unbending Stalin could be. FDR wanted the conference held in the Mediterranean but Stalin would not go beyond Soviet territory.24 Since Tehran, Roosevelt had become increasingly suspicious of Soviet intentions. On December 31, 1944, he told Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson that "Stalin has taken Britain's desire to have a cordon sanitaire of friendly nations around it in past years as an excuse now for Russia's intention to have Czechoslovakia, Poland and all other nations whom it can control around it." Roosevelt told a group of U.S. senators the United States did not have the power to prevent Russia establishing a sphere of influence over eastern Europe.25

Consequently, the president's strategy for Yalta (February 4-11, 1945) was to keep quiet about efforts to develop an atomic bomb,26 bargain with Stalin in regard to the Far East and work to satisfy American public opinion about eastern Europe rather than try to rescue the region from Soviet control.27 The U.S. still wanted the Soviet Union to enter the Pacific war, principally to limit American casualties. The atomic bomb, though promised, by no means was definite and its potential power uncertain.28

Although Roosevelt worked hard and long at Yalta, his physical condition was poor. His skin had a deep grey color and his eyes were expressionless. Lord Moran, Churchill's physician, believed FDR had all the symptoms of advanced hardening of the arteries of the brain.29

Roosevelt was more concerned with guaranteeing Soviet entry into the Pacific war than with comparatively minor irritations to the Chinese, though Stalin's claims were flagrantly imperialistic. However, Stalin found it easier to compromise in China than in eastern Europe. China represented little threat to Soviet security. He thus made only modest claims upon China.30

Stalin and Roosevelt came to an understanding without Churchill.31 Churchill signed without comment, it being "an American affair," as he said. FDR and Stalin agreed that Korea should be ruled by a Soviet-U.S.-British-Chinese trusteeship for an indefinite period before being granted independence. The Soviet Union reaffirmed it would enter the Pacific war two or three months after the German surrender. The conditions for this entry were that Outer Mongolia was to remain a Soviet satellite, Russia was to get southern Sakhalin and the Kurils, the Manchurian trunk railways were to be operated by a Soviet-Chinese company, Dairen was to be internationalized as a free port and Port Arthur was to be leased as a Soviet naval base.

There were, however, curious additions to the agreement. First, the three powers confirmed that "the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union" were to be safeguarded at Dairen and in operation of the railways. Second, though there was a sentence that the agreement covering Outer Mongolia and Manchuria "will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek," there was a contradictory sentence that "the heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated." The first qualifying sentence belonged to Roosevelt, the second to Stalin. Roosevelt had added the first without insisting on removal of the second. It was a typical example of Rooseveltian imprecision: it seemed to, but didn't actually, give Chiang an escape clause.32

Roosevelt believed Chiang would welcome the agreement because Stalin agreed to sign a friendship pact and alliance with Chiang's government and thus recognize the Nationalists, not the Reds, as China's leaders. Roosevelt felt such a promise by Stalin would preserve Chiang's regime.33 To preserve security, Chiang got no formal notice of the Yalta terms until June, although he got informal word in April.34

* * * * * * * * * *

Hurley and Wedemeyer returned to Washington in late February to bolster their positions. Hurley also had heard rumors of big concessions at Yalta and wanted to know what they were.35 On February 28, 1945, as soon as Hurley had gone and the tight reins he'd held on the embassy loosened, all the political officers there rose in defiance and denounced Hurley's policies. Their statement arrived in Washington just ahead of Hurley. It was one of the most remarkable documents in American foreign-service history. An entire embassy staff voted its collective lack of confidence in the serving ambassador and had the temerity to tell Washington.

The message charged that Hurley's policy of supporting the Nationalist government alone and as the "only possible channel for aid to other groups" was swelling Chiang Kai-shek's feeling of strength and making him unwilling to compromise. If U.S. military leaders felt Red forces were needed, the U.S. should order such cooperation on the basis of "military necessity" and should support efforts to create a supreme war council with Communist representation and some responsibility.36

When Ambassador Hurley saw the Chongqing message, he commenced a campaign to eliminate any possibility that the embassy staffers' message would get a sympathetic reading and was eminently successful.37

The complainers were junior officers appealing over the head of their boss. Except in a clear case of flagrant error the top brass would be unwilling to accept their criticisms. Hurley was confidently predicting success of his program of conciliation between Yan'an and Chongqing and U.S. leaders did not know this had no basis in reality. Also Hurley, along with General Wedemeyer and Commodore Milton Miles of Navy Group, China, were telling the Joint Chiefs that the Chinese Reds had extremely limited military capacity.38 Therefore the top U.S. military believed the Communists could be rather easily dealt with.39 In coming up with this false appraisal of Communist capability, all three men ignored contrary reports by their own agents in Yan'an.40

The China hands' proposal actually offered no solution. The United States decided in January to provide the Chinese Reds military aid only if approved by Chiang. To reverse this decision would either have started a stampede of Nationalist hangers-on and warlords to Yan'an to seek endorsement from the Reds or it would have created the "two Chinas" that Roosevelt did not want. Anyway, the U.S. no longer needed substantial military assistance from the Chinese. Therefore, no "military necessity" existed to bring the Communist Chinese forces into the war.41

President Roosevelt met twice with Hurley but neither recorded their talks. FDR also met with General Wedemeyer, whose major reaction was shock at the president's appearance. "His color was ashen, his face drawn and his jaw drooping," Wedemeyer wrote. "I had difficulty in conveying information to him because he seemed in a daze."42

* * * * * * * * * *

Although Stalin's encroachments at both ends of his empire could be explained as seeking security from future aggression, they led instead to an American fear that the Communists were conspiring to drive out democracy and spread their ideology worldwide. Part of this conviction came from an unreasoning belief that all Communists everywhere professed the same internationalist views and that the Soviet Union was controlling and directing all Communists.

One of the earlier expressions of this fear was a speech March 15, 1945, by Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota, a former medical missionary to China and a strong advocate of the Nationalists. Judd called Chiang a great patriot and denounced the Chinese Reds as evil Soviet puppets. Shortly beforehand, John Foster Dulles, a prominent Republican attorney, told a Cleveland, Ohio, world-affairs council that the people of China "shall not become harnassed to the predatory design of any alien power."43

Although the conspiracy theory conflicted with the hope that Stalin would carry out his Yalta promise to support Chiang Kai-shek at the expense of the Chinese Communists, important thinkers like George F. Kennan, a political officer in the Moscow embassy, and John Paton Davies, Jr., now also in the Moscow embassy, saw large Soviet designs on China and viewed the Chinese Communist movement as being substantially under Moscow's thumb.44 The U.S. ambassador to Moscow, W. Averell Harriman, soon came to the conviction that international Communism, under Soviet control, was on the move. If the United States made the mistake of supporting "Communist armies in China against Chiang Kai-shek we should have to face ultimately the fact that two or three hundred millions of people would march when the Kremlin ordered."45 Undersecretary of State Grew predicted a gloomy future in which the Soviet Union, after absorbing eastern Europe, would expand through the rest of Europe and the Near East. "Once Russia is in the war against Japan, then Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea will gradually slip into Russia's orbit, to be followed in due course by China and eventually Japan."46

* * * * * * * * * *

The immediate result of the Chongqing political officers' revolt was that Ambassador Hurley got most of them transferred. John Stewart Service, who'd returned to Yan'an, on March 30 received an order from Hurley to depart for Washington immediately. Others followed soon afterward. In April, 1945, Hurley replaced George Atcheson, chargé who had actually signed the February 28 message, with Walter S. Robertson, a conservative Richmond, Virginia, banker.47 Once back in Chongqing, Hurley ordered his embassy to produce only reports favorable to the Nationalist government. News of this censorship got back to Washington but nothing happened.48

It's ironic that one of the last reports Service made was a confirmation that there was little hope for a Red-Nationalist reconciliation. It concerned an announcement by Chiang Kai-shek on March 1 to call a "national congress" in November, 1945, to institute immediate "democracy." Mao told Service the congress a shabby deceit which would divide the country because it would include only a few non-KMT delegates and would rubber-stamp KMT decisions.49

While in Washington Hurley managed to break an elaborate security barrier and get details of the decisions at Yalta regarding China. The president encouraged Hurley to return to Chongqing by way of London and Moscow to seek British and Soviet support for a democratic, united China under the Kuomintang.50 In London on April 3-4, Hurley got a less than enthusiastic reception. Prime Minister Churchill branded American long-range policy in China to turn Nationalist China into a bastion for stability in the Far East "the great American illusion."51 In Moscow on April 17, 1945, Joseph Stalin was more friendly. He told Hurley he would support a free and democratic government under Chiang Kai-shek and would cooperate in efforts to unify China's armed forces.52

Back in Chongqing, Hurley told Chiang Kai-shek the provisions of the Yalta conference related to China without identifying them as such. Chiang didn't like the idea of Russia's interests in the Manchurian railways and at Dairen being "preeminent."53 However, there was little Chiang could do.

Chapter 29: Japan Slides toward Destruction >>

1. Romanus & Sunderland, Time, pp. 73-75.

2. Ibid., p. 73-74.

3. Ibid., p. 74; Schaller, p. 202.

4. FRUS, China, 1944, pp. 741-3; Romanus & Sunderland, Time, p. 75; Schaller, pp. 202-03. McClure presented the plan to Chen Cheng on December 19, 1944, and probably to T.V. Soong about the same time.

5. FRUS, China, 1944, pp. 732-3.

6. Davies, p. 383; Romanus & Sunderland, Time, pp. 251.

7. Romanus & Sunderland, Time, pp. 251-2; Schaller, p. 203; Barrett, p. 76; Davies, p. 383.

8. FRUS, China, 1941, pp. 739-40.

9. Davies, pp. 383-6; Schaller, pp. 203-04; Wedemeyer, pp. 318-9.

10. Dallek, p. 502-03. Stettinius had been undersecretary of state and, before that, chairman of the board of U.S. Steel Corporation and a prominent figure in the administration of the national industrial-mobilization program. Dallek says FDR felt Stettinius would not challenge his control over policy formation or excite Republican opposition and thus would not undermine FDR's bipartisan approach to world affairs.

11. FRUS, China, 1944, pp. 745-9. John Carter Vincent, chief of the Chinese affairs division of the State Department, responded to Hurley's message with a memorandum, apparently intended for Stettinius, on December 26, 1944, in which he agreed that American policy was to prevent the collapse of the Nationalist government and to sustain Chiang. See above, p. 750. President Roosevelt, in a conversation with his cabinet in December, 1944, defended Hurley and complimented him on the "swell job" he was doing. He never had occasion to cricitize Hurley. See Schaller, p. 191.

12. FRUS, China, 1944, pp. 291, 704-06, 721, 723, 755; FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 173-4, 242-3; Barrett, pp. 77-78; Schaller, p. 204; Romanus & Sunderland, Time, pp. 63, 167.

13. Schaller, pp. 204-05.

14. The Joint Chiefs of Staff produced a political appreciation of the situation in China about January 12, 1945, in which the chiefs held that "under existing circumstances it would not be advisable to deal with other elements as long as the central government remains in power and opposed to such dealings. Such action would seriously impair our relations with the central government and endanger its very existence." As long as the U.S. continued to recognize the Nationalists as the legally constituted government of China, any attempt "to deal with other elements, including the arming of such elements, would be a breach of faith." See FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 169-72.

15. FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 168-9, 174.

16. FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 172-7 (also printed in FRUS, Yalta, pp. 346-51); Schaller, pp. 205-06; Romanus & Sunderland, Time, pp. 74-75, 252; FRUS, China, 1944, pp. 741-3; Davies, p. 383.

17. FRUS, China, 1945, p. 181.

18. Romanus & Sunderland, Time, pp. 251-3.

19. Schaller, p. 205; Romanus & Sunderland, Time, p. 338.

20. Schaller, pp. 206-07; Davies, p. 402; FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 209-10; Romanus & Sunderland, Time, pp. 75, 251, 254.

21. Schaller, pp. 208, 213.

22. FRUS, China, 1944, pp. 180-1, 211; Schaller, pp. 206-07.

23. On February 18, 1945, Hurley sent Stettinius a long summary of the talks up to that point. The message described in great detail the fundamental conflict of both sides and should have shown to any reasonable person the impossibility of a compromise. See FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 223-30, 231-2, 233-4.

24. See the long exchange of correspondence on the subject in FRUS, Yalta, pp. 3-23.

25. Dallek, pp. 507-08. Two excellent books on the events at and consequences of Yalta are Diane S. Clemens, Yalta, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, and Daniel Yergin, The Shattered Peace: the Cold War and the Origins of the National Security State, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. This volume does not attempt to analyze decisions at Yalta other than those related to China and the Far East. The complete record of the conference, however, is available in FRUS, Yalta.

26. Just prior to the Yalta conference Secretary of State Stettinius received papers from Major General Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, that the gun-type atomic bomb, estimated to produce an explosion equivalent to several thousand tons of TNT, would explode and that the probable date would be about August 1, 1945. The 509th Composite Group of the Twentieth Air Force (B-29s), designated to deliver the bomb, was organized on December 17, 1944, and was undergoing training and assisting in tests. See FRUS, Yalta, pp. 383-4; Birdsall, pp. 287-8.

27. Dallek, p. 508.

28. Ibid., p. 516.

29. Ibid., p. 519.

30. Schaller, p. 210.

31. FRUS, Yalta, pp. 768-71.

32. Ibid., pp. 379-83, 385-8, 894-7, 984. For an American interpretation of the Yalta agreement regarding Outer Mongolia and Manchuria, see FRUS, Potsdam, pp. 864-72.

33. Dallek, p. 519. The actual language of this sentence was as follows: "For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the national government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke."

34. Romanus & Sunderland, Time, pp. 339-40; Schaller, p. 211. The leaders at Yalta agreed that regular conferences between the foreign ministers of the Big Three had been useful and they decided on regular meetings as often as necessary. The ministers held their first in London in September, 1945, and their second in Moscow in December. See FRUS, Yalta, pp. 974-5.

35. Schaller, p. 212; Romanus & Sunderland, Time, p. 336.

36. FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 242-6; Buhite, pp. 188-9. George Atcheson, Jr., chargé of the embassy, signed the message but it noted it had been "drafted with the assistance and agreement of all the political officers of the staff of this embassy." The message was largely the work of Raymond Ludden and John Service, both detailed to the Dixie mission.

37. Kahn, p. 153; Schaller, p. 215.

38. Romanus & Sunderland, Time, p. 338; FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 249-54. In a press conference in Washington on April 2, 1945, Hurley said that the strongest military force in China, stronger than all the warlords and Communists, was still the national government of China. See FRUS, China, 1945, p. 318.

39. William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time, New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw Hill, 1950, p. 337; Romanus & Sunderland, Time, p. 338. However, writing only a short while later (April 15, 1945) John Paton Davies, Jr. said "it is difficult to believe that Chiang's armies, even though rejuvenated by American supplies and training, can accomplish what the Japanese have, in nearly eight years of effort, failed to do—effectively conquer north China." The Reds, he said, had solid support of the masses and could be expected "at the very least to hold what they now have north of the Yellow river." See FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 335-6.

40. One result of Wedemeyer's discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March, 1945, was to bring Commodore Milton Miles's Navy Group, China, under his command. For an analysis of this group see Schaller, pp. 231-50; Romanus & Sunderland, Time, p. 338. Miles told his own story in A Different Kind of War, New York: Doubleday, 1967.

41. Buhite, p. 187.

42. Wedemeyer, pp. 340-1; Romanus & Sunderland, Time, p 338.

43. Schaller, pp. 217-8.

44. FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 342-4, 346. Neither Kennan nor Davies made any claims of a Communist worldwide conspiracy. Rather their comments were more directly in line with a Soviet policy looking toward protection of Soviet national interests. However, neither saw much chance for an independent Chinese Communist national policy for China. Kennan (above, pp. 343-4) said on April 26, 1945, that Russia sought in China "a minimum of foreign influence other than Russian," plus major influence in north China and "prefers, if feasible, to work through others and to veil the means by which her real power is exerted. For this reason I have no doubt that she would prefer to work through an inwardly strong and nominally independent national Chinese government sufficiently reliable and subservient to constitute an effective channel of influence." In June, 1945, Davies (Davies, p. 406) said "it is clear that Communist China can now operate only in the Soviet orbit," and "Communist China will become a part of the USSR's security cordon, because, if for no other reason, it will scarcely be accepted by any other foreign alignment." For a somewhat different Davies view, see his analysis of April 15, 1945, in FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 334-8.

45. Schaller, pp. 224-5 cites John Melby, The Mandate of Heaven, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, p. 22, and diary entries of May 14 and July 29, 1945, in the James Forrestal Papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J.

46. Grew, vol. 2, pp. 1445-6.

47. Schaller, p. 215; Davies, p. 404; Kahn, pp. 159-60; Buhite, pp. 193-4; Wedemeyer, p. 343.

48. FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 348-50; Davies, p. 404.

49. FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 254-8, 259, 268-9, 272-8, 399. In announcing the national congress, Chiang Kai-shek said the Communists and other parties would not have legal status until after constitutional government had been established and, unless the Reds handed over its military and political areas, it could not hope to achieve legal status.

50. Romanus & Sunderland, Time, pp. 338-9; FRUS, China, 1945, p. 317-22, 326-7, 330; Buhite, pp. 203-09; Schaller, p. 218.

51. FRUS, China, 1945, pp. 331-2.

52. Ibid., pp. 338-45.

53. Romanus & Sunderland, Time, pp. 339-40.