24. China's Moment on the World Stage

The Western Allies' decision at Trident to delay a second front in France until May, 1944, angered the Soviet premier, Joseph Stalin. He had expected a second front in 1943, most definitely didn't consider the invasion of Sicily, which began July 9, as qualifying and sent FDR several abusive telegrams. To deal with the problem, Roosevelt proposed a high-level Anglo-American conference in Quebec, followed by a full-dress meeting with Stalin in the fall.1

Trident had not settled British-American differences. The nondecision regarding Burma had satisfied neither side. The quick fall of Sicily and strong hints the Italians were tired of the war raised questions once more about a Mediterranean strategy.2

Roosevelt and Churchill set their meeting at Quebec City, Canada, for August 14-24, 1943. On July 25, the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel III, with the backing of the Fascist party, arrested Benito Mussolini. The new premier, Pietro Badoglio, immediately began to search for peace.3 Though German troops quickly occupied Italy, the Badoglio government surrendered and the Western Allies decided at Quebec to go ahead with an invasion of the Italian peninsula. Nevertheless, the American chiefs insisted on a firm commitment to invade Normandy in May, 1944. At the same time, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that an American would be named commander of the Normandy invasion (Overlord) while British officers would lead Mediterranean operations and a new Southeast Asia command, which included Burma.

Churchill selected Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, a cousin of the king with a permanent rank of captain, to head the Southeast Asia command (though agreeing over British reluctance to Stilwell as deputy commander). Churchill was still pursuing a plan to invade northern Sumatra as a stepping stone to recovering Singapore. Neither the British chiefs of staff, Roosevelt nor the American chiefs were impressed with Churchill's arguments and they discouraged the Sumatra project.4 The Americans were reluctant to become involved in recovery of British, Dutch and French colonies.5

In most respects, the Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated the policies to defeat Japan they had adopted at Trident: to capture northern Burma, build up air supplies over the Hump and advance west through New Guinea and the central Pacific. The chiefs also substituted "a port in China" for their previous plan to capture Hong Kong specifically.6 And they authorized a study for a gigantic bombing offensive after the defeat of Germany, using eight-hundred B-29 Superfortresses from China. They also called for building a fuel pipeline from Calcutta to Kunming, following the route of the Ledo and Burma roads as ground forces advanced.7 The plan emphasized air power, especially the still untried Superfortresses with their 1,500-mile tactical radius and ten-ton bomb capacity.8

After Quebec, air force planners scaled down the B-29 concept to operation Matterhorn, to start in the spring of 1944 with B-29s based around Calcutta and staged through airfields around Chengdu in Sichuan province. Matterhorn's aim was to cripple Japan's steel industry by destroying its coke ovens.9

The air forces still assumed that China would remain the only Allied territory within bombing range of Japan, though the Joint Chiefs planned to attack the Marianas, only about 1,400 miles from Japan.10 During the conference there was an illuminating exchange between General Henry H. Arnold, army air forces commander, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, British air staff chief. Arnold said adequate island air bases were not available in the Pacific. Portal responded that he couldn't understand why since Malta in the Mediterranean was a small island and the British were basing five-hundred aircraft on it. Arnold, apparently thinking of more southerly islands, replied that most of the Japanese-held islands were atolls with very limited land area.11 But the Marianas were of volcanic and uplifted coral formation and had plenty of space.

Quebec also marked the agreement of Roosevelt to share information with Britain on the supersecret Manhattan Project to develop atomic energy. Joint efforts at understanding atomic power had begun in the fall of 1941. In the second half of 1942 work had shifted to development and manufacture. Work was almost wholly by the U.S. Some of FDR's advisors recommended against sharing data with Britain but Churchill pressed Roosevelt and he agreed on full collaboration.12

* * * * * * * * * *

At Quebec Winston Churchill brought along Brigadier Orde Wingate to describe to the Combined Chiefs his lightly armed, air-supplied Chindits or long-range penetration groups as a possible means to drive the Japanese out of Burma and to prove that the British were not malingering there. Wingate created the vision, ephemeral as it turned out, of an easier reconquest of Burma. Sir Alan Brooke said the British were forming six long-range brigades in hopes of reopening a road to China.13

General Marshall decided to send some 3,000 commando-type American troops to work with the Chindits. Stilwell, who still held out hopes for a major U.S. force under his command, was incensed. In his diary he wrote: "After a long struggle we get a handful of U.S. troops and by God they tell us they are going to operate under Wingate!"14

* * * * * * * * * *

T.V. Soong saw the establishment of the Southeast Asia command as an opportunity to advance himself. His key to power was lend-lease, which Stilwell controlled. Therefore Stilwell had to go. Once in control of lend-lease, Soong could build a personal power base by granting Chinese generals goods for loyalty and believed he could ingratiate himself to Chiang and possibly take Chiang's place. In Chongqing Soong enlisted cronies to conduct a whispering campaign to turn Chiang Kai-shek more openly against Stilwell, repeating to him with embellishments every critical and unkind thing that Stilwell had said. The campaign succeeded.15

Meantime, two allies, who at first sight seemed most unlikely, began working in Stilwell's behalf. They were T.V. Soong's sisters, Madame May-ling Chiang and Soong Ai-ling, wife of H.H. Kung, minister of finance. These intensely political, calculating and capable women had recognized their brother's intentions, observed his backstairs conniving and, to protect their own and their husbands' positions, had declared war against T.V. Soong. They quickly showed that, however effective their brother was as a Washington lobbyist, he was no match to them in the byzantine palace politics of Chongqing. They let Nationalist leaders know they saw what was happening and would remember who was loyal and who not. He Yingqin, army chief of staff, who had been leading the drive against Stilwell, immediately changed sides. On October 17, Madame Chiang invited Stilwell to the Generalissimo's residence, described how he was to show a little humility and flexibility (which he reluctantly tried to do) and coached Chiang on how to be pleasant and a bit more accommodating (which he also tried to do). Stilwell and the Generalissimo patched up a reconciliation and T.V. Soong immediately fell from grace. Chiang ordered him to report sick and go home. For many months he played no part in the relations between China and the U.S. Nevertheless, Stilwell realized there was little more he could do in China and thenceforth he focused his attention on Burma.16

* * * * * * * * * *

Roosevelt and Churchill had been trying to get Joseph Stalin to meet with them to discuss war strategy and, hopefully, cooperation after the war. Immediately after Quebec, Stalin again turned aside an FDR-Churchill invitation for joint talks. But he did agree on a conference of the American, British and Soviet foreign ministers, scheduled in Moscow October 19-30, 1943. FDR persisted in his efforts for a meeting and Stalin finally agreed but specified Iran as the site.17 The probable reason for Stalin's change of mind was the Soviet success against the Germans in the battle of Kursk, which raged in the summer of 1943. In it the Russians crushed the last major German offensive and seized the initiative. Until Kursk, the Western Allies had held the advantage because Stalin wanted a second front to relieve German pressure on the Soviets. Now the shoe was on the other foot: the Western Allies wanted Stalin to relieve pressure on landings in western Europe or the Mediterranean.18 Stalin's reason for selecting Iran was to go only to a place where he had control. Russian troops were occupying northern Iran to protect supplies coming up from the Persian gulf.19 Although FDR tried various strategems to get the meeting moved elsewhere, he finally accepted Tehran for the first summit conference between the three leaders, set for November 27-December 2, 1943.20

The Russians saw the Moscow foreign-ministers conference in October as a place to nail down a commitment by the Western Allies to invade northern France in the spring of 1944. U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden confirmed this commitment in a protocol.21

FDR saw the Moscow conference as a chance to establish a postwar international peacekeeping organization called the United Nations and, incidentally, to deflect Republican or isolationist efforts to make postwar arrangements an issue in the 1944 presidential campaign. In this campaign FDR planned to run for an unprecedented fourth term. On August 10, FDR approved a draft declaration committing the U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union and China to a united postwar effort to maintain peace. Prior to the Moscow conference, both Britain and China approved.22

Roosevelt wanted a four-power declaration to emphasize his portrayal of China as a great power. Although China was not represented, Hull pressed V.M. Molotov, Soviet foreign affairs commissar, to include China. Molotov hinted this was a rather bizarre way of doing diplomatic business and was alert to any association with China which Japan would consider provocative. But he finally agreed after Hull said failure to include China would create "terrific repercussions" in the Pacific and a severe negative reaction among the American public. The Chinese ambassador to Moscow signed the declaration for China on October 30, 1943, with the British, U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers.23

The four-power declaration gave China immense international prestige and Chiang Kai-shek was grateful to Roosevelt and Hull for their efforts. The declaration set the stage for another move by FDR to raise China in the public's mind to great-power status. This was to invite Chiang and Madame Chiang to confer with Roosevelt and Churchill at Cairo immediately before the Tehran conference.24 The Cairo conference, set November 22-26, 1943, would place Chiang at the center of the world stage for the first time in the war. A Cairo conference preceding Tehran also would give FDR and Churchill and the Combined Chiefs an opportunity to go over their strategies before confronting Stalin.

But while the Cairo conference was being arranged, events were taking place which were reducing China's importance in the war. The first hint came at the Moscow conference, where Averell Harriman, who'd just taken the post as U.S. ambassador to Moscow, reported the Russians were ready to join the war against Japan after the Germans were defeated. Joseph Stalin himself came to the October 30 meeting and specifically promised such help.25 If the Soviet Union entered the Pacific war, an American-Chinese land campaign in China would be unnecessary. The need to modernize Chinese armies or press Chiang to fight would be much less important. Recapture of Burma now made sense only to help the air war.

At the same time a sea change was coming in American strategic thinking about defeating Japan. The growing might of the American navy's fast-carrier task forces and the dawning appreciation of the B-29 Superfortress's potential power were leading lower levels of U.S. planners to an awareness that, whatever Russia did, the United States could bring Japan to its knees without a land campaign in China.26 The Joint Chiefs already had ordered attacks on the Gilbert islands in November and the Marshalls in January, 1944, a process they hoped would open the central Pacific to U.S. warships. On October 25, 1943, the combined U.S.-British staff planners recommended only one major role for China: the limited B-29 Matterhorn operation. They also pointed out at last that good bomber fields could be built in the Marianas. In light of this, the War Department decided a joint amphibious and overland attack on a "port in China" was unnecessary and the key to victory was an all-out campaign through the central Pacific.

At the moment when China for the first time gained the spotlight as a major participant in the war and as a great power, its strategic significance plummeted to minor status.

It was pure coincidence that the events which marked the start of the new American Pacific strategy began on November 20, just two days before the Cairo conference opened. On that date U.S. forces attacked the Gilberts, renowned in American history by the names Makin and especially bloody Tarawa, where the 2nd Marine Division on the first day lost a third of the 5,000 men who came ashore. Despite their losses, the marines pressed the 3,000 defending Japanese into two interior strong points. The Japanese solved the marines' problems by switching over to repeated and foolish "banzai" counterattacks against the marine emplacements. The leathernecks literally wiped the Japanese out. The marine losses, 1,009 killed, 2,101 wounded, shocked the American people and caused a violent controversy. But the Gilberts campaign led to many improvements in amphibious techniques which reduced losses in later landings. Also, the naval operation, which cost only a single escort carrier, proved that the carrier groups could halt Japanese air attacks wherever delivered.27

The Gilberts led Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, central Pacific commander, to change plans for capture of the Marshalls. Instead of attacking the nearest, most easterly, of the islands, Nimitz ordered them bypassed and the blow to fall on Kwajalein atoll, four-hundred miles farther west. Thereafter, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance was to seize Eniwetok, at the far northern end of the chain and only a thousand miles from the Marianas. Island-hopping was about to begin, to the great confusion of the Japanese, who sent reinforcements to the easterly Marshalls, where they could serve no purpose.

* * * * * * * * * *

At Sextant, code name for the Cairo conference, Lord Mountbatten outlined a proposal for a number of British and Chinese troop movements to recapture Burma but he mentioned no amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal.28 Chiang responded with his fixed idea: success in Burma depended upon naval operations to seize Rangoon as the only way to prevent Japanese reinforcement of Burma. Mountbatten pointed out drily that the Japanese had recently completed (with Allied prisoners-of-war and coolies) a railway linking Bangkok with the Burmese rail system and no longer depended upon Rangoon.29

Ignoring the new Japanese railway, Chiang insisted on an amphibious operation simultaneous with the land attack.30 Mountbatten reacted angrily and Roosevelt got into the act. Churchill was dragged as well into what he described as "the Chinese story, which was lengthy, complicated and minor." Churchill complained that "the Chinese business occupied first instead of last place at Cairo" and British-American talks to seek agreement on strategy prior to the meeting with Stalin never came about.

Seeking a compromise between British and Chinese positions, FDR promised Chiang the British would launch an amphibious operation, Buccaneer, against the Andaman islands in the Bay of Bengal to serve as air bases from which to bomb Rangoon. However, such bases would have been only a hundred miles closer to Rangoon than some already in Allied hands and hence of little help in the Burma campaign. Chiang hinted he'd authorize a ground attack only when the British launched their Andamans move or if he got a billion-dollar "loan" from the U.S. Churchill began a dogged effort to talk FDR out of Buccaneer.31

The official communiqué of the Cairo conference vowed to strip Japan of all islands it had occupied since World War I and formally promised to restore Manchuria, Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu) islands to China and "in due course" to grant Korea its independence.32

Roosevelt also agreed that the U.S. would bear the cost of its military effort in China, including building the new B-29 staging air bases around Chengdu. Unfortunately, he didn't settle on an exchange rate and Chiang insisted on 20 Chinese dollars to 1 American dollar, whereas the black-market rate was 100 or more to 1. The potential for KMT extortion was enormous.33

* * * * * * * * * *

At Tehran, the American legation was about a mile from the Soviet and British compounds by way of narrow streets with plenty of potential ambush points. The Soviet and British ministries were back to back, with only a narrow alley separating them. V.M. Molotov, the Soviet foreign commissar, asserted that German agents had learned of Roosevelt's presence in Tehran and planned a "demonstration." He offered Roosevelt quarters within the Soviet compound. Few believed the German-agent story and decided Stalin didn't want to travel to and from meetings through those dangerous streets. FDR readily agreed to move and was delighted with the prospect.34

At the conference (code-named Eureka), Stalin quickly discovered that the British were pushing hard for an alternative to Overlord, especially in the form of an effort to bring Turkey into the war.35 Stalin therefore concentrated on undermining British opposition to Overlord and, because he saw FDR and Churchill were in disagreement, realized he did not have to negotiate on any political questions.36

FDR backed Overlord as top priority and seized on a Stalin proposal for an invasion of southern France, proposing that the staffs work out a plan to strike there.37 From that point on, Roosevelt and Churchill were in retreat. It was especially so because Stalin assured them that, once Germany was defeated, "it would then be possible to send the necessary reinforcements to Siberia and then we shall be able by our common front to beat Japan."38 This confirmed the promise made at Moscow and eased the strategic outlook of the Pacific war.39

To guarantee Soviet assistance, Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff acquiesced to Stalin's territorial demands. This led inexorably to Soviet domination of eastern Europe.40 It also led to Roosevelt's and Churchill's eagerness to grant what Stalin desired in the Far East. Stalin wanted southern Sakhalin as well as the Kuril island chain northeast of Japan. Their possession would turn the Sea of Okhotsk into a Soviet lake. Stalin also wanted Dairen (Lüda) in southern Manchuria and joint control of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railways. And, though both Britain and the U.S. had only recently renounced unequal treaties, foreign concessions and extraterritoriality in China, they quickly agreed to give all these again to the Soviet Union and without any consultation with the Chinese government.41 In only one desire in the Far East was Stalin thwarted: stripping Indochina away from France. Although Roosevelt agreed that the French should not be allowed back in, the British, French and Dutch worked together to reestablish their former empires.42

At Tehran the Combined Chiefs decided on Overlord to take place early in June, 1944, plus an invasion of southern France (code-named Anvil) in conjunction with Overlord. However, they also authorized keeping sixty-eight landing ships, tank (LSTs) in Italy until January 15, 1944, for the projected Anzio invasion hopefully to turn the flank of the Italian line.43 If these LSTs did not get back to England in time for Normandy, others earmarked for Anvil would have to be sent. This turned the Combined Chiefs' eyes directly on the thirty-two landing craft allocated for Buccaneer, the proposed "political" invasion of the Andaman islands to satisfy Chiang Kai-shek. The chiefs made no decision, but Buccaneer was in danger.44

* * * * * * * * * *

Back at Cairo, FDR, Churchill and the Combined Chiefs fell into a heated dispute over Buccaneer, the British wanting to abandon it, the Americans to keep it. While this battle raged, the Combined Chiefs addressed themselves to the much bigger matter of Japan's military destruction. The strategic situation was now greatly different since Stalin had promised to enter the war after the defeat of Germany. The chiefs came to a major decision: the principal effort was to be made in Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's drive through the central Pacific toward the Marianas.45

The chiefs gave all other operations, including those in China, only subordinate roles. Buccaneer was the first to fall. Landing craft were in extremely short supply and Churchill pointed out that the present plan was to put only three and a half divisions ashore in Normandy on the first day, whereas the Allies had nine landed divisions in Sicily the first day.46 Since the stakes at Normandy were infinitely higher, Churchill's statement clinched the argument.47

FDR called in his chiefs of staff and informed them he had decided to abandon the Andaman islands plan. In an interview with General Stilwell and John Paton Davies, Jr., Roosevelt said: "I've been as stubborn as a mule for four days but we can't get anywhere and it won't do for a conference to end that way. The British just won't do the operation and I can't get them to agree to it." He said Churchill had given in to him and Stalin at Tehran on the early Normandy invasion and implied giving up on Buccaneer was his favor in exchange.48

Chapter 25: Burma: "Munching a Porcupine Quill by Quill" >>

1. Dallek, pp. 401-05; Harriman, pp. 216-8.

2. Dallek, pp. 409-11.

3. The record of the Quebec conference, code-named Quadrant, including the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at Hyde Park, New York, beforehand and conversations in Washington afterward, is contained in FRUS, Washington and Quebec, pp. 391-1340. See also Churchill, Ring, pp. 66-97, 118-38; Bryant, pp. 528-95; Dallek, pp. 409-15; Tuchman, pp. 489-94; Romanus & Sunderland, Mission, pp. 355-63.

4. Bryant, pp. 583, 587; FRUS, Washington and Quebec, pp. 861, 900-01, 904, 945, 1127,

5. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 371-2.

6. FRUS, Washington and Quebec, pp. 427, 432-4, 981-8. The British were unhappy with the Trident plan because capture of Hong Kong would be primarily achieved by Chinese troops. This would undercut postwar British control of Hong Kong.

7. Ibid., pp. 859-60, 906-09, 921, 938, 945-47, 973-88, 995-1000, 1003, 1125; Romanus & Sunderland, Command, pp. 11, 14-15.

8. The total range of the B-29, depending upon the model, was 4,000 to 4,200 miles with a 20,000-pound bomb load. The aircraft's maximum speed was about 360 miles per hour and its service ceiling was about 32,000 feet, above the ceiling of most Japanese fighters at the time. See Birdsall, p. 323.

9. Ibid., p. 1125; Romanus & Sunderland, Command, pp. 15-17; U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946, pp. 44-45, 76-77, tables C-16, C-17; Birdsall, pp. 30-31. Japan had in late 1943 a steel-making capacity of about 14 million tons a year. About 5 million tons capacity was idle because of raw-materials shortages.

10. FRUS, Washington and Quebec, p. 877.

11. Ibid., pp. 859, 861-2.

12. Dallek, pp. 416; FRUS, Washington and Quebec, pp. 638, 647-8, 1117-9 (text of agreement). The atomic research and development program carried the code name Tube Alloys. The Manhattan Engineer District (or Manhattan Project) was the primarily U.S. effort to develop the bomb. Britain and the U.S. agreed never to use the bomb, if developed, against each other or against third parties without the other's consent.

13. Churchill, Ring, pp. 67-68; Bryant, pp. 565-6, 568, 580, 586; FRUS, Washington and Quebec, pp. 860-1, 879, 908, 961, 993, 1006.

14. Tuchman, p. 492; Romanus & Sunderland, Mission, pp. 366-7.

15. Romanus & Sunderland, Mission, pp. 371-2, 374-9; Tuchman, pp. 497-506.

16. Romanus & Sunderland, Mission, pp. 384-5.

17. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 23-24; Dallek, p. 418.

18. Eubank, p. 105-06.

19. Britain and the Soviet Union jointly invaded Iran in September, 1941, to eliminate German fifth-column activities there and to insure safe passage of American lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union.

20. Details on arrangements for the Cairo and Tehran conferences are given in FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 3-107.

21. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 134-44.

22. FRUS, Washington and Quebec, pp. 692-706, 925; FRUS, China, 1943, pp. 819-21, 823; Dallek, pp. 419-21.

23. FRUS, China, 1943, pp. 819-35.

24. Chiang asked to meet Roosevelt before he met with Stalin. See FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, p. 56, 67-83; FRUS, China, 1943, pp. 160-1, 164.

25. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, p. 147; Dallek, p. 422; Eubank, p. 258; Harriman, p. 243.

26. Romanus & Sunderland, Command, pp. 53-55.

27. Liddell Hart, World War, pp. 510-2; Romanus & Sunderland, Command, p. 55; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960, pp. 112-86.

28. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 280, 293-4, 312-5; Romanus & Sunderland, Command, pp. 61-62; Dallek, p. 426.

29. In June, 1942, the Japanese imperial command ordered the nearly 62,000 Allied prisoners of war still in the region (mostly British empire) and 270,000 impressed coolies to hack out the railway line almost entirely with hand tools across the jungles of the Dawna range separating southern Burma from Thailand. Due to overwork, inadequate food and diseases, many thousands of these prisoners and coolies died before they completed the line in October, 1943. See Romanus & Sunderland, Mission, p. 233; Problems, p. 91.

30. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 334-5, 338-40; 342-5; Romanus & Sunderland, Mission, p. 284.

31. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 299, 346-51, 354-5, 366-7, 430-1, 871; Romanus & Sunderland, Command, pp. 65, 74-75, 298-9, 308; Churchill, Ring, p. 328; Davies, pp. 278, 280.

32. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 366-7, 399-404, 448-55, 566. The participants agreed to hold release of the official communiqué until they got approval of it by Stalin at Tehran. Stalin fully endorsed the communiqué, but added that "the Chinese must be made to fight, which they have not thus far done" (p. 566).

33. FRUS, White Paper, p. 499; Romanus & Sunderland, Command, p. 77.

34. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 460, 463, 464-5; Harriman, pp. 263-4; Churchill, Ring, pp. 342-4.

35. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 523-4.

36. Eubank, p. 282. Keith Eubank's book, Summit at Tehran: the Untold Story, New York: William Morrow, 1985, is an excellent and incisive analysis of the conference and its effects.

37. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 492-5.

38. Ibid., p. 489, 499-500.

39. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 529-30, 618-9; Eubank, p. 299.

40. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 590-2, 594-6, 597-600; Eubank, p. 359.

41. On November 30, 1943, at Tehran Roosevelt actually suggested establishing Dairen as a free port before Stalin mentioned any warm-water port he wanted in the Far East. See FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, p. 567. The record of Tehran contains no mention of the Soviet demand for southern Sakhalin and the Kurils. However, on January 12, 1944, President Roosevelt announced at a meeting in Washington of the Pacific War Council, made up of United Nations fighting in the Pacific, that Stalin indicated at Tehran he wanted both territories so as to exercise control of the straits leading to Siberia. See above, pp. 868-70. He also, FDR said, wanted the Manchurian railways to become property of the Chinese government, but a note in FRUS, White Paper, p. 113, referring to the 1945 Yalta conference accords, said Russian use of the railways and establishment of Dairen as a "free port under international guaranty" was discussed at Tehran, without giving the source of the statement. Apparently the Soviet demand to lease Port Arthur (Lüshun) as a naval base did not come up at Tehran, but was confirmed at Yalta, as was joint Soviet operation of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railways. See above, p. 114. See also Eubank, p. 421.

42. Eubank, p. 336; FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 484-5, 509, 514.

43. The LST was a 4,000-ton vessel that could carry about 150 troops with their equipment or forty tanks and pull right up on enemy-held beaches to disgorge them. The U.S. built 1,041 during the whole war, but in 1943 their production was too small for the needs. See Martin Blumenson, Anzio: the Gamble that Failed, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1963, pp. 41-42, 47, 51-52, 166, 197-206.

44. FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 555-64, 576-7, 579.

45. Ibid., pp. 687-8, 765-73, 779-81.

46. The discussions about Buccaneer and its relations to the success of Overlord and Anvil are contained in FRUS, Cairo and Tehran, pp. 675-81, 699-704, 705-11, 719-22, 724, 725, 796-7, 815-7.

47. Ibid., p. 681, 706-07, 710.

48. Ibid., p. 725-6, 803; Davies, p. 280; Romanus & Sunderland, Command, p. 72.